Compliance
The core provisions on compliance are contained in article 15, 16 and 18 of the Nagoya Protocol. However, they are quite vague and their main task is therefore to oblige the parties to take effective and proportionate compliance measures to ensure that access to genetic resources and traditional knowledge could be obtained only on the basis of prior informed consent and after mutually agreed terms were established. While article 15 (on genetic resources) and article 16 (on traditional knowledge) basically say the same thing, article 18 adds to it that parties should ensure that their legal system can be invoked to settle possible disputes arising from MAT 25 . In addition, parties should encourage users and suppliers of genetic resources and traditional knowledge to include provisions on dispute resolution in the MAT 26 .
To support compliance, monitor the use of genetic resources and traditional knowledge and to increase transparency, article 17 of the Nagoya Protocol prescribes various monitoring provisions. For example: designating one or more checkpoints, in which the relevant information about PIC, MAT and the origin of the genetic resources is collected 27 , but also creating a permit that comprises an international certificate of compliance. This certificate serves as evidence that access to the genetic resources in question was obtained with PIC and
MAT have been established in accordance with the requirements of the supplier country 28 .
The international certificate of compliance must also be delivered to the ABS-Clearing House.
Article 14 of the Nagoya Protocol provides for the establishment of the ABS Clearing House as an international platform for the distribution of information concerning access and benefitsharing. Without prejudice to the protection of confidential information, each party should provide the necessary information to the ABS Clearing House 29 . This information should 25 Art. 18.2 NP. 26 Art. 18.1 NP. This means amongst others: provisions regarding which law will be applicable, to which court they will submit a dispute, and possible alternative dispute resolution options. 27 Art. 17.1, a) NP. 28 Art. 17.2 and 17.3 NP. The internationally recognized certificate of compliance shall contain the following minimum information when it is not confidential: the issuing authority, date of issuance, the provider, a unique identifier of the certificate, the person or entity to whom prior informed consent was granted, the subject-matter or genetic resources covered by the certificate, confirmation that mutually agreed terms were established, confirmation that prior informed consent was obtained; and whether it is for commercial and/or non-commercial use (art. 18.4 NP). 29 Art. 14.2 NP. Additional information, if available and as appropriate, such as: relevant competent authorities of indigenous and local communities, model contractual clauses, methods and tools developed to monitor genetic resources; and codes of conduct and best practices, may be shared through the ABS-Clearing House (art. 14.3 NP).
include at least: the legal, administrative and policy measures concerning ABS; information on the national focal point and the competent national authorities; and permits that served as evidence for PIC and MAT at the time of access.
Less straightforward, but also relevant for the compliance is article 13 of the Nagoya
Protocol, that obliges the parties to designate a national focal point and a competent authority.
The national focal point is responsible for the communication with the Secretariat and to provide the necessary information (about the procedures to be followed to obtain PIC and MAT and about the competent national authorities, indigenous and local communities and stakeholders) to applicants 30 . The competent national authority is responsible for granting access or, as applicable, provide written evidence that the access requirements are met. The competent authority also gives advice on the applicable procedures and requirements to obtain PIC and MAT 31 . These functions may be performed by one and the same entity 32 .
European Regulation 511/2014
In the European Union, Regulation (EU) no. 511/2014 implements the Nagoya Protocol. This
Regulation entered partly into force on the 12 th of October 2014, whilst some provisions (namely article 4, 7 and 9) only came into force one year later. In this section we will briefly examine the most important articles of the Regulation. Further we will have a look at some shortcomings of the Regulation on the basis of some examples.
Implementation of the Protocol by the Regulation
Article 4 contains the obligations of users of genetic resources and traditional knowledge. It prescribes users to exercise due diligence to ascertain that genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources which they utilise have been accessed in accordance with applicable access and benefit-sharing legislation, and that benefits are fairly and equitably shared upon mutually agreed terms, in accordance with any applicable legislation 33 .
To do so, users have to seek, keep (for 20 years after the end of the period of utilisation) and transfer to subsequent users the internationally-recognised certificate of compliance and information about the content of MAT which is relevant for subsequent users 34 51 These are all the PGRFA from the 64 listed crops from Annex I ITPGRFA that are "in the public domain" and "under the management and control" of the national authorities. The multilateral sharing system under the ITPGRFA allows parties to use the PGRFA that it holds for free (or against minimal transaction costs). Unlike the Nagoya Protocol (which creates a bilateral system) it is multilateral, meaning it is less tailored to the individual cases, but also there's less administrative follow-up work. Further, parties achieve no direct benefits for the PGRFA they bring into the system, instead, the advantage they benefit is the (free) access to all PGRFA in the system. planttreaty/agreements/smta/SMTAe.pdf). The MTA does not set the same minimal requirements as the international certificate of compliance (under the Nagoya Protocol). Also the enforcement mechanism addressing non-compliance under the ITPGRFA is, though more uniform, not as far-reaching (issuing a warning or publishing cases of non-compliance) as -possibly-under the Nagoya Protocol.
However, as a consequence of article 4 §4 regulation 511/2014, also PGRFA that are not included automatically in the ITPGRFA sharing system, will under certain conditions not be affected 53 by the Nagoya Protocol. This is the case if the party from where the PGRFA originate, states that these will be subjected to the standard material transfer agreement (MTA) 54 , if the PGRFA concerned are under its management and control and in the public domain 55 .
In other words, article 4 §4 allows member states to exclude, except from the PGRFA falling automatically under the multilateral sharing system, a number of other cases from the scope of the Nagoya Protocol and to instead subject those to the ITPGRFA sharing system. Given that the ITPGRFA sharing system is not as obligatory and comprehensive as the ABS system envisaged by the Nagoya Protocol, one could question the EU's compliance with the Nagoya Protocol.
In the original draft regulation the ITPGRFA was not even mentioned, but in consideration 10 56 . Consequently the Commission noted that the exact relationship between the measures to implement the Nagoya Protocol and the utilization of genetic resources in accordance with the ITPGRFA was ambiguous. According to the Commission, member states could develop a differing policy on this point, which it considered unfavourable 57 . While addition of the current §4 to article 4 of Regulation 511/2014 brings more clarity, it also raises questions about how far the Regulation should go in interpreting the Nagoya Protocol. 52 Art. 4, §4 Nagoya Protocol; Cons. 12 and art. 2, §2 Regulation 511/2014. 53 In the sense that users shall be considered to have exercised due diligence (art. 4, §4 Regulation 511/2014). 54 This is applicable to the PGRFA in the multilateral sharing system. 55 It is however, not always clear whether or not a PGRFA is under national management and control and in the public domain. Even in collections under semi-public or national public universities, those boundaries are often vague. 56 As a specialized instrument that may not be affected by the regulations implementing the Nagoya Protocol. Therefore, Regulation 511/2014 only covers traditional knowledge to the extent that it falls under the same contract (MAT) as the genetic resources to which it relates. It is however not unthinkable that access is sought to traditional knowledge separately from the genetic resource to which it relates. A broader approach, in which access and benefit-sharing with reference to traditional knowledge is made independent from access and benefit-sharing concerning the genetic resources to which this traditional knowledge is linked, is thus clearly
Commission Staff working document: Impact assessment, accompanying the document, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization in the Union
needed. Yet to get there, several obstacles must be overcome.
First of all, the lack of an internationally recognized definition of traditional knowledge appears to be a major barrier 58 . So far, nor in the Nagoya Protocol, nor in other international instruments a definition of traditional knowledge is agreed on 59 . It is problematic that the Nagoya Protocol does not specify how and under which conditions knowledge in a particular case can be qualified as "traditional knowledge". Since there is no procedure to protect knowledge as "traditional knowledge" under the Protocol, this qualification seems to be left to the parties and the indigenous and local communities 60 .
58 Cons. 20, Regulation 511/2014 and SWD/2012/0292 final. 59 In the negotiations of the Nagoya Protocol, there were two views on whether or not to include a definition that clarifies traditional knowledge. The argument that the term, particularly in the light of Article 8 (j) CBD speaks for itself, was more decisive than the argument that a formal definition would better define the scope of the Protocol. Art. Since the Regulation 511/2014 fully came into force in October 2015, European member states are bound to implement its provisions in their national legislation. Now, one year later, it is interesting to see how several member states made the transposition and adapted their legislation, whilst others are playing a waiting game and are still discussing the competent authority or the format of the regulations.
In this section we will take a closer look at the implementation of Regulation 511/2014 in five EU member states. To this end, we will examine the enforcement and inspection tools that have been (or are being) created in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, Germany and Belgium. Before giving more attention to some uncertainties arising from the text of the Nagoya Protocol and the Regulation 511/2014, we make a concise comparison of the approach and the introduced enforcement systems in the member states under review. -entry to the premises without warrant has been refused or is likely to be refused, and notice of the intention to apply for a warrant has been served on the occupier;
The implementation of the
-asking for admission to the premises, or serving notice of entry, would defeat the object of the entry;
-entry is urgently required; or -the premises are unoccupied or the occupier is temporarily absent 70 .
Further, an inspector may stop all vehicles that the inspector has reasonable grounds to believe are transporting evidence to check them 71 .
Article 11 defines the powers of inspection more in detail. It allows inspectors to inspect the premises and any products, goods or biological material found there; have access to, inspect and copy documents, records or other information, in whatever form they are held, and remove them to enable them to be copied; take samples of products, goods or biological As regards the inspection, the by the Federal Agency for Nature Conservation appointed inspectors have the right to consult documents and to take copies thereof, to do tests (including sampling) and to enter and examine the operational and administrative premises and land (during the operational hours) 101 To regulate the access to genetic resources, a declaration and permit system is proposed in To use genetic resources for commercial purposes, it is necessary to obtain a permit from the competent authority prior to the utilisation (such a permit should be delivered within two months after the deposit of the MAT) 119 . The permit may be refused, as far as it is motivated, if:
-the competent authority and the applicant (where appropriate after conciliation) do not agree on the distribution of benefits;
-the proposal for the distribution of benefits from the applicant clearly does not correspond to his potential (financial and technical); or -the activity or its potential applications risk to affect biodiversity in a significant way by limiting the sustainable use of genetic resources or by exhausting the genetic resources 120 .
117 For an overview of the legislative procedure and documents see:www.senat.fr/dossier-legislatif/pjl14-359.html#block-timeline. 118 Art. 37 (amending L.412-7 and following) Biodiversity Law. 119 Art. 37 (amending L. 412-8) Biodiversity Law. 120 Art. 37 (amending L. 412-8, IV) Biodiversity Law.
Given that the Nagoya Protocol touches upon several diverging matters, it may not be surprising that the competent authorities for each of these matters (nature-science-economyagriculture-...), claim the right to regulate the issue. The use of genetic resources is indeed widespread in various sectors: from applications in the pharmaceutical industry to, among others, biotechnology, food and cosmetics. Because the competences over these sectors are divided among the federal state (responsible for science and economy), the regions (responsible for nature, agriculture and environment) and the communities (responsible for scientific research and education), this easily leads to a temporary impasse with retardation as a consequence. And in fact the tangle is twofold. Not only is there disagreement possible about which is the competent authority (federal vs regional) but also within the authorities it remains unclear which are the competent policy areas (nature vs agriculture) 140 .
In order to determine in the competences in casu we need in the first place to look at the Nagoya Protocol and by extension at the CBD. As the objectives set out in the Protocol determine the internal distribution of competences. As its name says, the objective of the Nagoya Protocol is the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic resources. In the introduction we already stressed that this fits within the framework of the protection and conservation of biodiversity, since the protocol is the implementation of the third objective of the CBD 141 . Moreover, the Protocol was negotiated and approved by the Flemish Minister for Nature and Environment (and co-approved by the Flemish MinisterPresident). The Regulation 511/2014 has its legal basis in article 192, §1 TFEU 142 , which includes the environmental competence of the European Union. Taking this into account, it is rather logical that the subject matter falls within the competence of the Minister of Nature.
We may therefore assume that the Regions, based on their competence for nature protection and conservation (article 6, §1, III, 2° BWHI 143 ), are competent to promulgate regulations to implement the Nagoya Protocol and the Regulation 511/2014. However, an important comment needs to be made. This legislation will after all, and even mainly, have an impact on other policy areas. Scientific research on genetic resources or that makes use of genetic 140 As both the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Nature claim to be the competent authority on the regional level. resources will for example be affected by this legislation, but also the production of medicines or cosmetics based on genetic resources will be affected by the new regulations.
It would lead us to far to discuss the Belgian division of competences for this matter thoroughly. Instead we would like to put emphasis on a possible solution.
Though several scenarios are possible, a cooperation agreement seems to be the most appropriate solution, seen the complex interconnectedness. In such a cooperation agreement the regions, the communities and the federal state may clearly define their competences and agree on a common policy. Existing cooperation agreements on other issues could serve as an example for an ABS-cooperation agreement. Depending on the priorities, the cooperation agreement on the transit of waste 144 , or the REACH 145 and Seveso III 146 cooperation agreements would be more suitable. The first one assures more uniformity and efficiency as it gives more responsibility to the federal state and less discretionary power to the regional level (consequently, less administration and coordination will be necessary). Whilst the other two leave more discretionary power to the regional authorities (to install their own inspection and sanctioning system), guaranteeing that the division of competences is respected. As a consequence, the REACH and Seveso III cooperation agreements require more coordination and conflicts of competences cannot be ruled out. Though, the superordinate consultation bodies 147 these establish, are likely to give an adequate answer to this problem.
Comparative law
As regards the competent authority, we see that the transposition of that are likely to come into contact with genetic resources and/or traditional knowledge about these resources, and to effectively involve these checkpoints in the control chain.
On the other hand, this way of working requires more coordination, which makes it more difficult to control as in one plan drawn up on the basis of a risk-based approach. Moreover, such a system may lead to less specialization (about this matter) within the inspectorate and allow for a difference in the carrying out of the inspections. While, a (more) uniform method of inspecting, by one and the same inspectorate, allows a higher level of specialization and probably creates more legal certainty. For those reasons giving the responsibility to one inspectorate might be desirable.
Remarkably, France is the only state (of the five reviewed member states) that introduces a licensing system. This system allows a far-reaching control over the commercial use of genetic resources and traditional knowledge, and provides the government more leverage to negotiate a fair distribution of benefits. A possible disadvantage of the licensing system is that it will render the use of genetic resources cumbersome for the users. As they shall, instead of having to make a simple declaration, have to apply for authorisation, which will likely be more time-consuming.
Concerning the sanctioning system, the emphasis in each of the five member states is 
Issues arising from the implementation
As mentioned above briefly, parties to the Nagoya Protocol encounter a lot of ambiguities when transposing the Nagoya Protocol into national law. An important part thereof stems from inadequate or incomplete definitions of key concepts. Further, wordings as "as appropriate" and "in accordance with domestic law" give more discretionary power to the parties and render the obligations less clearly defined. Which in turn can lead to less legal certainty.
It also remains vague from which date the protocol applies. Especially the situation in which access to genetic resources or traditional knowledge was obtained after the entry into force of the CBD, but before the entry into force of the Nagoya Protocol, creates confusion. On the one hand it could be argued that access that took place before the entry into force of the Nagoya Protocol, constitutes an act or a situation that ceased to exist before the entry into force of the Protocol and consequently does not fall within the temporal scope of the protocol.
On the other hand, article 3 of the Nagoya Protocol, which determines the scope of the resources, it also requires benefits, arising from research and development, commercial and other uses of genetic resources, to be shared 154 .
Usually it is assumed that, with regard to "access", the Nagoya Protocol applies to genetic resources and traditional knowledge to which access was sought after its entry into force. This often leads to the conclusion that the same is true as regards "benefit-sharing" 155 . This is, however, not necessarily the case. More precisely, it is possible that genetic resources or traditional knowledge to which access was obtained before the entry into force of the Nagoya Protocol, are continued to be used after its entry into force. And such situations cannot be excluded from the conditions set out in article 5 156 . The Protocol is, for example, not applicable to existing patents that are based on traditional knowledge, but as soon as these patents expire, the Nagoya Protocol requires PIC or involvement and consent from the indigenous and local communities concerned, if the traditional knowledge on which the patent was based would continue to be used.
In contrast to the Protocol, the scope of the Regulation 511/2014 is clearly defined. Article 2.1 states explicitly that the Regulation only applies to genetic resources and traditional knowledge to which access was obtained after its entry into force. Yet, it is questionable whether this narrow scope is consistent with the Nagoya Protocol.
Conclusion
Although the Nagoya Protocol is an important step forward for the protection of biodiversity and the fight against biopiracy, it may be clear that it is a compromise text, with all the issues arising therefrom. The lack of a clear definition and the high level of discretionary powers afforded to the state parties, obstructs a uniform and efficient implementation. of obligations. Moreover, the Regulation is clearly written by a majority of user states, which has found its resonance in some too lax or too limited provisions. Furthermore, it is remarkable that although the EU considered legal certainty highly important, it afforded a broad margin of appreciation to the member states as regards the enforcement mechanisms.
On the national level however, we see that this does not lead to extremely discrepant national enforcement mechanisms, at least with regard to the five member states under review.
Broadly similar inspection and sanctioning systems apply in those member states: the Netherlands and Germany appointed one inspectorate, whereas France chose to empower all the inspectors that potentially come into contact with the use of genetic resources as the competent supervisory authority. Though the emphasis, concerning the sanctioning system, is different in each of the five member states (Germany and the United Kingdom tackle situations of non-compliance mainly administrative, whereas France and the Netherlands put the emphasis on criminal sanctioning), the types of sanctions and enforcement measures appear to be quite similar. Obviously, each of these approaches has its own advantages and disadvantages.
In implementing the obligations arising from the Nagoya Protocol, state parties may encounter several uncertainties. The most important being inadequate or incomplete definitions of key concepts, wordings as "as appropriate" and "in accordance with domestic law" (as these give more discretionary power to the parties and render the obligations less clearly defined) and the pending discussion about from which date the Protocol applies.
Compared to the other member states under review, it is striking how much Belgium lags behind. Much can be said about the limitations and ambiguities of the Nagoya Protocol and Regulation 511/2014, but in the Netherlands, Germany, France and England a law to implement the obligations under the Nagoya Protocol and the Regulation has been approved.
While Regulation 511/2014 has been directly applicable since October 2015, in Belgium no specific legislative steps have been taken to meet the obligations arising from it.
